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The Mischaracterization of the Pakhtun-Islamic Peace Culture
Created by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars 1
Shelini Harris
Australian National University
Abstract
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, whose peace activities included
nonviolent resistance to British rule in India, have remained relatively unknown despite the
magnitude of their achievement and significance (100,000 strong peace army). Even among
appreciative peace scholars their nonviolence has been mischaracterized as an adoption of
Gandhi’s teachings; Khan is referred to as the Muslim Gandhi. I argue that this is due to a
reliance on biased colonial sources, concomitant racist characterization of the Pakhtuns and
Islam, and an insufficient understanding of violence. I illustrate how this movement’s
motivation and inspiration were deeply rooted in Pakhtun culture and Islam, even though
Khan and Gandhi were spiritually alike, with the same peace cultural commitments, working
together for independence. A better understanding of this movement’s origins as indigenous
is crucial to avoid the vilification of these people that continues to justify violence against
them, constraining them to respond likewise.
Introduction
While Ghaffar Khan is not anywhere as well-known as his beloved ally Mahatma Gandhi,
much has been written about his nonviolent resistance to British rule. He worked side by side
with Gandhi, considering the older man a mentor when it came to organizing against the
British through the Indian National Congress. His own statements about how Gandhi changed
his life have been misunderstood to mean that Gandhi turned him from violence to
nonviolence (Rowell, 2009). This has led to him being referred to as “Frontier” or” Muslim”
Gandhi, often described as if he was a disciple who adopted Gandhi’s teachings of
nonviolence (Shah, 2015). Such a characterization distorts our understanding of violence and
nonviolence and prevents a genuine appreciation of Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai
Khidmatgars, as well as the Pakhtun/Islamic spirituality, values and broader culture that gave
rise to them. Other scholars have analyzed and discussed some of these misconceptions even
within peace studies (Arbab, 2017; Bala, 2013; Mahmoud Hanifi, 2016). Among the reasons
for the near amnesia about this very significant movement, as Safoora Arbab (2019)
observes, is the epistemology, heavily reliant on colonial representations, that has portrayed
Pakhtuns as violent and barbaric, due to their tribal culture and Islam. Such a depiction of the
Pakhtuns, has contributed not only to the misrepresentation of the Khudai Khidmatgar
movement as just a branch, an imitation of the Gandhi movement, but also to its
characterization, as Sruti Bala (2013) observes, as an aberrant phase of nonviolence in an
otherwise violent culture. As such, it would not be as noteworthy. In addition to this reason, I
shall discuss below, further political reasons for their relegation to being nothing but an
interlude in Pashtun history; it is hard to talk about Khan etc, without addressing the
processes by which they were sent almost to obscurity. Since not many will be familiar with
this movement, culture, and some of the historical context, I briefly outline it. Utilizing
sociological and subaltern theoretical insights I analyze some ways of interpreting colonial
accounts, (applicable to current ones as well, in this case, characterizations of violence vs
nonviolence), and show that contrary to dominant narratives, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his
fellow Kudhai Khidmatgars (Servants of God) engaged in a jihad (struggle or effort) to create
a culture of peace among the Pakhtun people, drawing on indigenous Pakhtun and Islamic
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resources (something noted by Gandhi). Had it not been such, it would never have succeeded
to the extent that it did (Shah, 2007), as we shall see later.
A People and A Movement Misunderstood
Outsiders have presented an entirely false picture of us to the world, and it is with
deep grief and sadness in my heart that I have to say this….Their love of freedom and
liberty is described as disregard for law and order, their bravery and courage is called
savagery…selfish governments use it as an excuse to crush the Pathans, to blow them
up with bombs, to mow them down with machine-guns, to destroy their hearths and
homes…mankind has tyrannised and outraged them…” (Ghaffar Khan, 1969, pp.
123-124)
…dominant colonial narratives about Pashtuns and imperial projects in Afghanistan
that have been ethnicized to such an extent as to border on racism…It is odd to hear
and read how much international love there is for Afghanistan given that conditions
on the ground resemble an endless prison for local populations who beyond the
growing ordinariness of military occupation are subject to panoptical surveillance
blimps, drones, night vision devices, and bio-tracking technologies to monitor and
control them. (Mahmoud Hanifi, 2016, p. 398)
The first quote is from Abdul Ghaffar Khan, talking about events occurring a century ago,
and the second is from a scholar about current events affecting the same people, the
Pakhtuns.2 The implications of how we understand and represent violence and nonviolence,
and how seriously we take history and context in our appreciation of our peace heroes is
critical. The two quotes above illustrate how characterizations of cultures and people as
violent or nonviolent can have lethal consequences; the very thing we in peace studies seek to
avoid. Peace scholars and admirers of the movement often operate within the same set of
stereotypical assumptions regarding Islam and the Pakhtuns that we decry in their oppressors-the British authorities, the Muslim League and certain Pakistani authorities. These are the
people who gave rise to one of the most powerful, deeply nonviolent movements committed
to creating a culture of peace under the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan.
Even many local scholars, reliant on the writings of colonial officers, repeat their versions of
conversations and events without any critical interpretation or contextualization. For instance,
in one such work on the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement (KKM), although sympathetic to the
Pakhtun struggle against the British, Karim Khan (1997) seeks to point out what a feat it was
that the Khudai Khidmatgars (KKs) and Khan transformed the inherently violent Pakhtuns.
Pointing out that “To be a ‘Pukhtun’ means to be violent” (p. 276), the author cites a British
officer’s account of a conversation he alleges to have had with a local Pakhtun religious
leader who had killed an elderly man (according to the officer), asking why he was not
making an attempt to stop the age old cycle of killing. He says the man replied, “You British
might---indeed you would---have the moral strength to stand alone for what you believe to be
right, but we (the Pukhtuns) are slaves of our Code (of Pukhtunwali) and remain bound by it”
(Emerson, 1941, quoted in Karim Khan, 1997, p. 277). This is one among numerous such
accounts, as we shall see in the following section on the historical and geographical context.
Historical Context, British Suppression and Characterization of Pakhtuns
The territory where the Pashtun people live straddles parts of what are now Pakistan and
Afghanistan, especially the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region known as the North West Frontier
Province until 2010, which had been part of the British Raj in India during the colonial period
(the name indicates the geographical location relative to British India). It is impossible to
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appreciate the significance and nature of this movement, and the reasons for the persistent
misunderstandings about it and the people of the region, without understanding the
geographical aspects of the region, the rugged and treacherous nature of some parts of the
terrain, and the location of the Khyber Pass within it. The latter is considered the only
passageway that is not too cumbersome to traverse, between what was then India (now
Pakistan) and Afghanistan, much of central Asia, Iran and so on (Banerjee, 2000). This was
how the Greeks and many others throughout history entered the region. The Pakhtuns were
constantly having to defend themselves from invaders (Banerjee, 2000; Shar, 2015).3 Most
importantly, the British considered this region a crucial frontier buffer zone between India,
which was their most valuable possession, and Russia.
Having conquered most parts of India in the nineteenth century, the British moved northward,
consolidating their power over the region that is now Pakistan. In the process, they engaged
in Anglo-Afghan wars to ensure their control, in what was known as the “Great Game”
(between Britain and Russia), introducing the problematic Durand Line in 1893, dividing
Afghanistan from British India (Banerjee, 2000; Saikal, 2010). The Durand Line literally ran
through the middle of Pakhtun tribal lands, separating them between two countries. As Amin
Saikal (2010) notes, it had the effect of “…seriously undermining their potential for unity and
prospects for an independent territory of Pashtunistan…it sowed the seeds of an enduring
border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan…” (p. 7). This whole endeavour into these
tribal areas was known as the Forward Policy, which was quite brutal. As noted above, the
Pashtuns were no strangers to having to defend their land, and as such, they fought back.
Despite facing defeats at times, they tended to revolt to reclaim their freedom and land. I
relate accounts of one such revolt to illustrate the nature of the exchanges between the
Pakhtuns and the British, and some of the ways in which each party is characterized by
British accounts.
During one such onslaught by the British in 1897 the tribesmen were inspired by a religious
leader, Mullah Mastun (referred to by Winston Churchill as the mad fakir), who claimed to
have divine guidance and support in calling for the uprising (Easwaran, 1984). I discuss a
couple of descriptions about the events surrounding this invasion and the tribesmen’s
response as it illustrates the type of narrative that has influenced how these people have been
characterized. The first is from the young Winston Churchill who had arrived in the region to
report on this frontier war. Because of the awareness of the military prowess of the tribesmen,
this Forward Policy of invading their territory and subduing them was not uncontroversial
among the British (Toye, 2011). Speaking of their tendency to fight and kill, Churchill (1898)
notes: “Such a disposition, combined with an absolute lack of reverence for all forms of law,
and authority, and a complete assurance of equality, is the cause of their frequent quarrels
with the British power” (p. 7). He also points out “Seizing all weapons, they become
Ghazis—as dangerous and as sensible as mad dogs: fit only to be treated as such” (p. 40).
Discussing how the Muslims in various countries, such as Sudan have tried to repel the
British, he states,
In each case civilisation is confronted with militant Mahommedanism. The forces of
progress clash with those of reaction. The religion of blood and war is face to face
with that of peace. Luckily the religion of peace is usually better armed. (p. 41)
The second account is from Woosnam Mills (1897), a British war correspondent who speaks
of peaceful submission after an earlier British expedition (he casually mentions numerous
“punitive” expeditions), and how the tribesmen had learned that it was unwise to oppose the
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British. He marvels at the wonderful adaptability of disposition of these border tribes who
return to their fields and daily business as if nothing had happened. He muses that this may be
because the British rule had been substituted for the anarchical state of things, giving security
to the country. Of course, if this was true, they would not have kept resorting to revolts after
brief periods of “pacification.” Like Churchill, he goes on at length about how fanatical the
tribesmen are and how the love of fight is second nature to them, and how “…British might
had been exhibited with such prodigality to our enemies…” (p. 6). He too refers to the mad
fakir saying “His excited appeals to the fanaticism which exists in every Pathan were
responded to in a manner little short of marvellous…the valour of the British arms fought
against untold odds and emerged victorious…” (p. 35). Churchill (1898) notes that “When
the northern savages, impelled by fanaticism…descended from the mountains and invaded
the plains, they were met by equal courage and by superior discipline...” (p. 304). He says
that the British then developed a “system of punitive expeditions, which has been derided as a
policy of ‘Butcher and Bolt’” (p. 304).
The colonial depictions of the Pakhtuns, were, apart from the obvioust bias, based on events
that occurred in the aftermath of such upheavals that had taken place in Pakhtun society.
Furthermore, the relatively egalitarian democratic social and economic system based on
pakhtunwali (Pakhtun code of conduct, discussed below), regarding land use, and jirga
councils were disrupted., at first, due to some interference by the Mughal and Kabul states in
their efforts to collect revenue from the tribal areas (Banerjee, 2000). However, the changes
wrought once the British took over the area significantly altered the whole system. For
instance, the British introduced their fundamentally different notion of ownership and granted
permanent and exclusive ownership to some of the big khans (landowners) who supported
them; this was not the case with most of the smaller khans (Banerjee, 2000; Shah, 2015). The
big khans and maliks (secular chiefs) were favoured by the British, receiving financial and
other forms of support in exchange for loyalty. They were often responsible for collecting
taxes, imposing punitive measures, British laws and policies, and overall administration on
behalf of the British (Banerjee, 2000). The British had certain mullahs (religious leaders) and
the maliks and big khans do much of their propaganda work for them (Karim Khan, 1997).
For many of the local people, their immediate sense of oppression was regarding these
middlemen. Furthermore, there were policies and practices 4 that cut off access to certain parts
of the territory to some tribes, making it difficult for them to access grazing lands to which
they previously had free access, including restricting water sources (Banerjee, 2000; Beattie,
1997). These were specifically aimed to bring the tribes to their knees and force them to
accept British occupation. Some of the blockades were intended to starve them by denial of
access to the above-mentioned resources, killing cattle and people, including denial of
passage to other non-tribal areas for trade (Williams, 2005). Given the roughness and
sparseness of the terrain, the tribal people relied heavily on trade to fulfil some of their basic
needs, so these blockades were quite devastating. These are some of the factors that created
the conditions that led to feuding and raids. This is not to say that prior to these externally
induced disruptions things were peaceful and just all the time. The point here is to understand
what seems to be an excess of feuding and raiding, something that was a major source of
distress for Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement (KKM) who sought to
transform this situation. They, of course, unlike external observers who tend to attribute it to
the system of badal or revenge, were aware of the reasons why their community had come to
this state of constant feuding.
All cultures, as peace scholar Elise Boulding (1998) has noted, carry within them dual
tendencies; practices that contribute to cultures of peace and violence. Human beings are not
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innately peaceful or aggressive, and as she notes, both capacities are there, with different
behaviors being manifest at different points, constantly having to balance both tendencies
(note that they are not simple good and evil capacities). In response to varying circumstances
these capacities, different skills and habits, which are part of what sociologist Ann Swidler
(1986) calls cultural ‘tool kits,’ are mobilized in different ways. Swidler (1986) observes:
“Culture does not influence how groups organize action via enduring psychological
proclivities implanted in individuals by their socialization. Instead, publicly available
meanings facilitate certain patterns of action, making them readily available” (p. 283). What
is in their tool kit includes, “symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use
in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems” (p. 273). These provide
certain strategies of action, a set of habits, skills and style, which are overall capacities, rather
than values or ends. As she argues (1986), people may have some of the same ends or values
in mind but go about achieving them quite differently based on the capacities and habits they
have built up; people can pull out justification from religious teachings and so on to support
contradictory actions. Boulding’s point is that it is not that certain cultures value peace over
violence or vice versa, they are constantly trying to balance them. This need to balance
nonviolent, egalitarian, violent, hierarchical, and other ways of doing things, requires that
they reach into the cultural tool kit for certain modes of actions and skills which can be
mobilized. But as Swidler (1986) notes, values are not good predictors of action in unsettled
times. She says:
In unsettled periods, in contrast, cultural meanings are more highly articulated and
explicit, because they model patterns of action that do not ‘come naturally.’ Belief
and ritual practice directly shape action for the community that adheres to a given
ideology. Such ideologies are, however, in competition with other sets of cultural
assumptions. Ultimately, structural and historical opportunities determine which
strategies, and thus which cultural systems, succeed. (p. 284)
We will discuss below how this relates specifically to the Pakhtun concept of badal,
(basically a cultural guideline regarding the importance of reciprocity, good and bad,
interpreted narrowly as revenge), which has been attributed the status of a cultural value or
end in itself (especially by outsiders), rather than a habit or mode of action which responds to
given structural and historical circumstances. My point is that given the relentless turbulence
experienced by the Pakhtuns, described above, it is not surprising that the negative vengeful
aspect of it was relied on and even valorised, because it offered the best defence against what
they faced constantly. However, the problem is that what works in some situations may not
work in others and it becomes a liability, with armed struggle being the mode of action even
within the community to the neglect of the many virtuous traditions of pakhtunwali; which is
where Ghaffar Khan and the KKM come in, as we shall see below.
In addition to these actual behaviours and responses, which as I have noted, are not all
unproblematic, we have the colonial characterizations I have described above. Subaltern
Studies scholars such as Ranajit Guha have offered useful ways of interpreting and
understanding some of these colonial accounts of historical events, given the lack of written
material that present the peasant/indigenous stories (most of what is available is in Pashto,
and a lot of material was destroyed). The subalterns are the most marginalized in colonial and
global societies, who do not have access to writing their stories, due to illiteracy, and lack of
social power, or the necessary platforms. Even when native voices are presented, it is that of
native elite who do not necessarily reflect the perspectives or interests of the subalterns.
Therefore, it is necessary when reading such historical material to employ a form of optics or
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lens that enables one to read between the lines. Thus, peasant insurrections, riots, raiding and
so on are far from the fanatical raiding of wild and crazed savages, but often the utilization of
the only means available to defend lives and interests. Guha (1999) provides a set of
“translations” of the colonial language about tribal/indigenous uprisings and insurgencies.
“…official document speaks of badmashes as participants in rural disturbances, this
does not mean (going by the normal sense of that Urdu word) any ordinary collection
of rascals but peasants involved in a militant agrarian struggle. In the same context, a
reference to any ‘dacoit village’ (as one comes across so often in the Mutiny
narratives) would indicate the entire population of a village united in resistance to the
armed forces of the state: ‘contagion—the enthusiasm and solidarity generated by an
uprising among various rural groups within a region; ‘fanatics’—rebels inspired by
some kinds of revivalist or puritanical doctrines; ‘lawlessness’—the defiance by the
people of what they had come to regard as bad laws, and so on.” (p. 17)
He points out that this sort of language was used to designate the ‘rival consciousness’ of the
rebels who wished to turn the world upside down, their struggle for justice and survival, as
crimes. Even Ghaffar Khan and the KKM were declared criminal.
What is apparent in the accounts by Churchill and others is that you have an invading force
that has travelled far from their own territory to profit from other people’s lands and labor, or
if we accept some of the colonial justifications, to civilize and bring progress to the savages.
If the latter, it would seem, that like the supposedly fanatical tribesmen, they too are willing
to shed copious amounts of blood of their ‘beneficiaries’ and value their own life so little (an
accusation against the tribesmen) as to risk such an enterprise. When the tribesmen fight
fearlessly, “they are fanatical mad dogs,” but when the British fight they have “courage and
valour, engage in punitive expeditions, and display British might.” This lack of selfreflection, of viewing events through a biased framework, had normalized the right of the
‘superior’ races to impose their interests and will over others to such an extent that in their
calculus black and brown lives and civilizations do not matter. This is reflected quite
brilliantly in Churchill’s statement that the religion of peace comes well-armed. In most
readings of such historical accounts, the British get excused for their behaviour because our
current sensitivities are said to be anachronistic--the tribesmen are not. Their actions, albeit in
defence of their own land and freedom against invaders, are pathologized as their inherent
nature.
This has to do with the problematic way in which violence is understood. Structural and other
forms of violence do not get recognized as such, especially since those responsible for it are
powerful; only the responses to such forms of violence are recognized and condemned as
violent, and as problems to be solved. Slow violence, according to Nixon (2011) is, “…a
violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is
dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as
violence at all” (p. 1). In this case, not even the brutal military assault and other obvious
forms of violence get counted as such. A dogmatic approach in evaluating situations, which
fails to distinguish between the desperate violence of the dispossessed and that of their
oppressors, classifying and condemning both parties, and more often just the dispossessed, as
“violent” and failing to display the virtue of nonviolence, we inadvertently end up upholding
systems of oppression. It is possible to promote nonviolence without such simplistic
dichotomizing of violence and nonviolence. It is in such a context that the KKM start their
activities, the Islamic call to wage jihad to restore justice and prevent what is wrong. In doing
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so, they reach into the Pashtun and Islamic tool kits, restoring what has been forgotten,
reshaping what had got distorted, learning from outsiders, such as Gandhi, who were also
inspired by God.
Resources for Peace Culture: Pakhtunwali and Islam
In this section I discuss some aspects of Pakhtun culture and Islam in light of the skills,
beliefs, habits and stories that can and were lifted out from the tool kit by Ghaffar Khan and
the KKM (discussed in the following section). Elise Boulding (2000) describes peace culture
as:
… peace culture is a culture that promotes peaceable diversity. Such a culture
includes lifeways, patterns of belief, values, behaviour, and accompanying
institutional arrangements that promote mutual caring and well-being as well as an
equality that includes appreciation of difference, stewardship, and equitable sharing of
the earth’s resources among its members and with all living beings…the societal
capacity for aggression or peacebuilding depends on patterns developed in every
domain, from the individual and the interpersonal to the national, and
interenvironmental…(p. 1)
The Pakhtun code of conduct is known as pakhtunwali; dating back over a thousand years
(Banerjee, 2000), which entails certain notions that serve as guides in various aspects of life,
from economic, social, religious, to political (Taj, 2011). Much of the practices and skills of
the KKM were derived from pakhtunwali. This includes the notion of melmastia or
hospitality, which requires loyalty and protection not only to friends and allies, but even
hospitality to enemies who may seek refuge within your home (Banerjee, 2000; Saikal,
2010). Another concept is nanawati, translated as forgiveness (Taj, 2011) and the giving of
sanctuary even to enemies (Banerjee, 2000). Also, the often talked about badal, which is the
call to respond to insult or injury-considered a form of vengeance (Banerjee, 2000; Saikal,
2010; Taj, 2011). However, scholars have pointed out that it has a broader meaning of
reciprocity, which can include reciprocating good and bad actions (Arbab, 2017). Another
concept is nang, which has been interpreted as the “the protection of sexual propriety”
(Saikal, 2010, p. 5), and maintaining a sense of honor and integrity (Banerjee, 2000).
Banerjee notes that this can be associated with the concept of purdah, which includes the
seclusion of women and also the honorable organization of domestic life, and jirga (this will
be discussed further below), which is the honorable organization of public life. Farhat Taj
(2011) points out that while pakhtunwali requires equality among all Pakhtun, it can be
gender discriminatory. The jirga is an elected group of elders. She notes that the code
includes artistic expression, and, also, living in peace with Muslims and non-Muslims.
Another major aspect of Pakhtun culture since the seventh century is Islam, in the form of the
more liberal Sunni Hanifi School (Mahmoud Hanifi, 2016; Saikal, 2010).
The jirga is a decision-making council of elders convened as the need arises, usually initiated
by local community members or groups, and as such, it is not a permanent committee. It has
the mandate to settle disputes regarding land, access to water, inheritance, and overall
maintenance of peace and order (Shah, 2015). Equality is very important within Pakhtun
culture as well as within Islam, and this system of need-based jirga ensured a level of
equality and democracy as consensus is required. The lack of permanence prevented any one
group of elders or members of the community becoming too powerful. M. Jamil Hanifi
(2004) notes that “it is the symbol of tribal autonomy” (pp. 297-298). Another significant
aspect of pakhtunwali was the system of wesh requiring periodical redistribution of land
among owners or khans, ensuring that any one group or tribe did not have permanent hold of
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certain parts of the land; as Banerjee (2000) points out, this was a way of maintaining the
egalitarianism central to pakhtunwali. Given the roughness of the terrain, not all parts of the
landscape would have been fertile or easy to access, so land ownership was not exclusive
with a lot of fluidity in the use of the land. The British invasion disrupted some of these
practices introducing high levels of inequality. These are some of the problems that exercised
Ghaffar Khan’s mind, which led to the formation of the KKM, which was active between the
dates of 1929-30 to around 1947, and was banned in 1948 by the Muslim League who were
in charge of the newly formed country of Pakistan (Banerjee, 2000).
The founder of the KKM, Ghaffar Khan, was from the family of a small khan (landed elite),
his father choosing not to collaborate with the British. His brother had gone to England to
study and returned as a doctor. Khan himself had the opportunity to go to England,
recommended by the British missionary Rev. Wigram who ran the school he attended.
Khan’s mother pleaded for him not to leave, so he decided to stay. Another prestigious thing
to do was to join the Guides, which was the local British military service. Until this point in
his late teens, he had not given much thought to British rule and its effects. He was offered a
commission in the Guides (in addition to his education, he was a very tall strong man, well
suited for the military) and was about to join when he had an awakening. He saw that a
fellow Pakhtun young man who was a member of the Guides was expected to bow down in
deference to fellow white soldiers; that was when he realized that they were never going to be
treated as equals and he refused to accept any British commission (Banerjee, 2000; Easwaran,
1984). Having seen the repeated failures of the violent uprisings, and the unbearable nature of
British oppression, he was desperate for guidance. This is when he decided to seek help from
God; Ghaffar Khan was a man of faith, and it was central to all he did (Easwaran, 1984). He
went into a mosque and fasted and prayed on his knees, occasionally shifting to sit cross
legged, for several days, asking God for strength and guidance. When he was done, although
he did not know exactly what he was going to do, he felt he was a different man and had a
powerful sense of awareness and the strength of God: “Islam! Inside him, the word began to
explode with meaning. Islam! Submit! Surrender to the Lord and know his strength!”
(Easwaran, 1984, p. 71). He knew he had to dedicate himself to the service of God, and that
was through humble service to the oppressed people. Easwaran likens this process to the
experience of St. Francis of Assisi. From then on, Khan acted with a deep sense of purpose
and commitment only matched by that of Gandhi.
His soul searching and delving into the Quran and hadith of the Prophet taught him several
things. Islam is quintessentially a religion of justice, and the notion of the abode of Islam
often refers to a society where justice prevails. As such, it is feasible that a non-Muslim
society in which justice prevails could be considered an abode of Islam (El Fadl, 2007). The
prime Islamic imperative is very much about the demand on every Muslim to fight against
injustice and oppression, not only in defense of Muslims but others as well (Abu-Nimer,
2001; El Fadl, 2007). As peace scholar Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2001) points out, in Islam,
justice and peace are interconnected and interdependent. It is the duty of every believer to
ensure justice prevails, for peace is an outcome of it. Crooke (2009) observes, “The
radicalism of Islam therefore lay in the command to build a community in which men and
women behaved with compassion, with respect for others—whatever their standing in life—
in which there was a fair distribution of wealth…Muslims are commanded actively and
literally to fight daily for justice and for human respect and compassion” (p. 7). This entails
the imperative of commanding right and forbidding wrong in many aspects of life, which is
not just about rescuing those in trouble, but attempting to prevent injustice or wrong in the
first place; a duty of every Muslim (Cook, 2006). It is a call to action. Khan (1969) says:
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“Religion teaches man truth, justice and virtue, and it awakens in the man the desire to
serve…The Holy Prophet Mohammed…said, ‘that man is a Muslim, who never hurts anyone
by word or deed, but who works for the benefit and happiness of God’s creatures…Belief in
God is to love one’s fellowmen” (p. 231). He points out that the Pakhtuns and Muslims in
general have forgotten the Prophet’s teachings and example, including the warnings against
greed, wealth, power, the importance of democracy, the rights of women, and so on (Ghaffar,
1969). He preached that these are the reasons why they had fallen into the practices of
feuding with each other and not giving women their due rights.
As to strategies of action, in delving into early Islamic history and the life of the Prophet,
Khan saw that peace and nonviolent resistance indeed was what was enjoined by Quranic
teaching. While he acknowledges that in the later Medina period the Prophet engaged in
armed struggle, it was only in order to prevent the ongoing death and destruction, and it was
in a context in which they had some hope of it being effective without leading to even more
deaths. It is important to note that the call to struggle for justice, preventing wrong and
promoting right, in Islamic teaching, comes with ample warnings and examples cautioning
against an overzealous implementation of these imperatives that ends up being more unjust
and destructive than the wrong one seeks to avert (Cook, 2006). Therefore, every effort to do
justice and good has to be evaluated judiciously with prayer. We see this throughout Ghaffar
Khan’s life and action. He realized that not only were the violent uprisings backfiring, the
constant feuding among the tribes was also making them weak and subservient to the British
(Banerjee, 2000).
As to the primacy of nonviolence, again, he drew on Quranic and early Islamic teachings.
During the persecution of the Meccans, the Prophet asked the Muslims to endure and never
retaliate. Many of them stood without renouncing their faith when facing of the brutality of
Meccans, even watching their elderly parents or family members being killed, without raising
a weapon against them (Ramadan, 2007). The Quranic and Prophetic teachings emphasizing
the transience of this life, eternal values, and God as ultimate refuge, were a great source of
strength and encouragement when faced with unbearable abuse. Also, within the Pakhtun
cultural codes discussed above, the imperative to offer refuge to enemies, among other
practices, required Pakhtuns to control their animosity, to exercise a high level of self-control
and refrain from taking revenge. Here was the deep cultural resource that could be drawn out
for nonviolent endurance of torture, which was potent, when combined with the Pakhtun
fearlessness.
Along with the tendency to de-Pakhtunize Ghaffar Khan and the KKM by making them seem
an aberration, there is also the tendency to de-Islamicize them. Among some who speak of
the movement, there seems to be a reluctance to talk about how deeply Islamic this
movement was, and those who do, often imply that Khan came up with his own peculiar
interpretation, reading Gandhi’s nonviolence into the Islamic teachings, or only picking out
the bits of Islamic teaching that support nonviolence. As I have noted above, cultures and
religions have multiple tendencies, and shaping a nonviolent response entails choice no
matter what the religion or culture. Gandhi himself, drew his commitment to nonviolence
from the Baghavad Gita, which was delivered in the middle of a battlefield, where Lord
Krishna exhorts the warrior Arjuna to fight the oppressive foes, while setting this mode of
action within the broader and more final teaching of the moral and spiritual supremacy of
nonviolence. That is, this final goal entails a higher level of spiritual evolution and
concomitant mode of being in the world. For one who is not yet at that level, fighting is
undertaken out of a sense of duty. So nonviolence is not to be chosen out of cowardice (this is
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something Gandhi emphasized), or partiality towards particular opponents, as was the case in
Arjuna’s reluctance, which was not due to an outright renunciation of violence per se (Gandhi
& Desai, 1960; Raghuramaraju, 2020). Therefore, to claim that nonviolence and peace are the
highest goals in Hinduism or Islam is not some kind of Gandhi-Khan innovation; both were
well within legitimate theological traditions. Some Western scholars have endeavored to
appreciate Islam as the source of Khan’s inspiration, yet one sees the influence of prevailing
misrepresentation of Islam (Johansen, 1997). One such scholar implies that being inspired by
Gandhi and having implicit trust in him as a man of God, Khan interpreted the Quran
accordingly, and that this may be because he was not theologically trained (Rowell, 2009).
Upholding nonviolence as the highest and most desirable goal does not necessarily entail a
total pacifism that precludes acceptance or tolerance of armed violence in certain situations in
a complex world. Khan and the KKM truly exemplified the core of the Islamic tradition, not
just some pacified version of it (Abu-Nimer, 2001). They repeatedly spoke in terms of jihad
(Banerjee, 2000) and Khan referred to the KKM as mujahideen (Tendulkar, 1967), and
during their demonstrations, a common slogan was “Allahu Akbar” -- “God is Great”
(Banerjee, 2000), reflecting their lived examples of what these terms really mean, rather than
what many have come to associate them with in our current global situation. Jihad (struggle,
effort) is a central and almost all-encompassing term in Islam, with what is known as the
greater and more important jihad being the personal moral and spiritual struggle to obey God
and purify one’s thoughts and conscience, to exercise self-control, to forgive, show mercy
and be charitable and just in all our dealings (Nasr, 2002). Similar to Gandhi’s emphasis on
swaraj (self-control) requiring control over one’s senses and passions before exerting control
over one’s society and nation, Khan’s efforts ( greater jihad) in reform were about inculcating
this inner spiritual and mental control out of which flowed the acts that lead to the
construction of a just and peaceful society, as well as nonviolent resistance (lesser jihad). The
lesser jihad includes armed struggle, but is generally the struggle against external injustices,
preventing wrong and so on. Here again, the KKM use of the term lesser jihad to refer to
their nonviolent resistance to British oppression is a perfect demonstration of the broader
meaning of even the concept of lesser jihad (Banerjee, 2000). This is consistent with the
Prophetic tradition: “The finest form of holy war is speaking out in the presence of an unjust
ruler and getting killed for it” (Cook, 2006, p. 6). The call to wage jihad does not
automatically mean armed struggle but resistance, like that of the KKM.
Khudai Khidmatgar Activities
Khan was impressed with his school-teacher Rev. Wigram’s commitment to service in
teaching and he wanted to emulate it. At the same time, he was troubled by the British
education offered; it was only accessible to the children of the landed elite and it served the
interests of British rule. Some of the mullahs (religious leaders) ended up rejecting education
altogether, arguing that it they would go to hell if they got educated (Ghaffar Khan, 1969). It
is in this context that the efforts of Khan and the KKM were taking place. He dedicated
himself to starting schools to educate the Pakhtun children. These azad or independent
schools were aimed at creating pride in the Pashto language and culture; the children were
taught Islamic values, mathematics, and a range of other subjects to provide them trade skills
(Ullah Khan, 2017). Special emphasis was placed on educating girls. The schools were free,
funded by community-raised money and were open to all regardless of caste or creed
(Banerjee, 2000). However, they faced opposition from some of these mullahs, the bigger
khans, and the British, who were all afraid that an educated peasantry would be harder to
cheat and manipulate, and therefore, more likely to unite in solidarity against their
oppression. Khan was arrested and put in jail (something that would keep happening
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repeatedly; eventually he would spend about one third of his life in jail). The British used
wealthy and powerful local men who were loyal to them to arrest peasants; the KKMs would
go and tend the crops of the latter (Shah, 2015).
Khan’s efforts had mainly focused on what they called the constructive program to improve
the lives of the Pakhtuns. However, with the constant repressions and brutality on the part of
the British, he realized that this was not going to be possible as long as the British were in
control. This led him to create the youth league of the zalmo jirga, who were young literate
Pakhtuns, and later, the creation of the KKM which included illiterate and older men and
women (Shah, 2015). Many of the smaller khans supported and joined the KKs, including
many of the Ulema (religious scholars) and some mullahs (Shah, 2015). Different groups
joined the movement for different reasons. As Shah (2015) observes:
To the Pashtoon intelligentsia, it was a movement for the revival of Pashtoon culture
with its distinct identity. To the smaller Khans, [however,] it was a movement that
demanded political reforms for the province that would enfranchise them and give
them a greater role in the governance. Its anti-colonial stand suited the majority of the
anti-establishment Ulema, who always regarded British rule in the sub-continent as a
‘curse’. For the peasants and other poor classes it was against their economic
oppressors, British imperialism and its agents ⎯ the pro-British Nawabs, Khan
Bahadurs and the big Khans (pp. 95-96).
The KK training emphasized discipline and military-like training, including physical fitness.
Banerjee (2000) notes, “While the KKs did not explicitly articulate this kind of holism, their
combining of physical fitness (through the discipline imposed by drill and parades) with
moral fitness (the cessation of feuding and forgiveness of past enemies) can be seen as an
analogous preparation of healthy citizens to challenge the decay of colonial rule” (p. 87). This
was part of the holistic jihad, or swaraj in Gandhian terminology. They had ranks and were
organized like a military, including a uniform. This was the famous Red Shirt. The British
tried to use the colour of their uniforms to accuse them of being Bolsheviks; however, the
reason they ended up with this colour was because white uniforms tended to get dirty as they
went around doing their social services, and being mostly poor, they only had access to this
brown/red colour in their territory (Banerjee, 2000; Shah, 2015). In addition to their role in
education, the KKs were involved in maintaining hygiene (Banerjee, 2000). They often
walked around with a broomstick, and the charkha or spinning wheel, which were all aimed
at attaining self-sufficiency. A major part of their reform, also derived from the Islamic
tradition, concerned transforming the oppressive aspects of the purdah, which included doing
away with women wearing veils. Khan (1929) stated “no nation can awake unless its women
are awakened first, and no nation can progress unless its women progress first, and. similarly.
a nation cannot get true independence unless its women rise up" (p. 25, quoted in Karim
Khan, 1997, p. 332). Khan pointed out that the Pakhtuns had forgotten this important
teaching from the Quran and the life of the Prophet who had struggled to give women rights
to inheritance, to not be married off against their will, and so on. The KKM introduced all
these changes in Pakhtun society. The KKs included many women who gave speeches,
including Khan’s sister, and they engaged in resistance activities, including marching with
the Holy Quran on their heads (Banerjee, 2000; Shah, 2015).5 Khan also started a local
newsletter, the Pakhtun, to which women contributed significantly, challenging patriarchy in
their writings.
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Due to the difficulty of the terrain, the relative isolation, and the tight control the British
established, it was extremely difficult for reporters or other observes to come from outside,
and the British censored the material that went out (Shah, 2007). This meant that the British
had a free hand in what they did to the people in the Frontier. As brutal and cruel as their
actions were within the rest of the subcontinent, the punishments they meted out to the KKs
reached into a whole different stratosphere (Johansen, 1997). They were beaten, their
properties were robbed and set on fire, the privacy of their homes violated, and whole
villages were punished. Supplies to their training camps were poisoned (Banerjee, 2000).
Khan himself was beaten mercilessly several times and had broken ribs (Shah, 2015;
Tendulkar, 1967). Given the emphasis on sexual propriety and modesty in Pakhtun culture,
one of the favourite ways of punishing the KKs was to strip them naked and make them
march in public, often being prodded in their private parts with weapons, castrated and
molested (and much worse). Some of these extended to such pornographic and cruel extents
that they make Abu Ghraib look like child-play (Banerjee, 2000; Shah, 2015). There were
several massacres, the most famous of which is the one on the 23 April 1930 at the Qissa
Khwani Bazaar, where over 200 of them were massacred (Banerjee, 2000; Shah, 2015).
Another significant event was when a platoon of the Indian Garhwal rifles refused to fire at
the unarmed people, and were dismissed and punished (Karim Khan, 1997; Tendulkar, 1967).
In all these instances, the KKs did not retaliate, and endured with a sort of stoic majesty. This
ability had been inculcated through all their discipline, which included engaging in menial
tasks, to foster a sense of humility and calmness (Banerjee, 2000). Before joining the KKM,
each one was asked to make sure they resolved all feuds they may have had, and many of
them found their own creative and touching means of doing so without Ghaffar Khan’s
involvement. Again, this was intended to ensure they developed their own abilities in making
peace (Banerjee, 2000). All these events led to more people joining the movement in
defiance; eventually they numbered around 100,000 (Arbab, 2017).
Khan’s imprisonment and the brutality inflicted on the KKs led Khan to the realization that
they could not survive or resist the British on their own (Shah, 2015). They at first sought the
support of the Muslim League, who turned them down because they did not want to resist the
British (Banerjee, 2000). The only choice was the All India National Congress to which
Gandhi belonged. Once the rest of India came to know about them they at least had some
degree of protection. Khan and Gandhi became very close, and as two deeply spiritual men,
they had more in common with each other than with any of the other leaders. However,
relying on the only available accounts of the Pakhtuns, Gandhi had at first been sceptical
about the prospect of nonviolent Pakhtuns. After actually getting to know them and talking to
them, Gandhi became their biggest fan and claimed they best exemplified his notion of
nonviolence; which is very often misunderstood even in peace circles. This is obvious in the
following conversation that Khan (1969) had with Gandhi:
I said to Gandhiji: ‘Gandhiji, you have been preaching non-violence in India for a
long time now, but I started teaching the Pathans non-violence only a short time ago.
Yet, in comparison, the Pathans seem to have learned this lesson and grasped the idea
of non-violence much quicker and much better than the Indians…in spite of all the
cruelty and the oppression the British inflicted upon them, not one Pathan resorted to
violence, though they, too, possess the instruments of violence. How do you explain
that?’
Gandhiji replied: ‘Non-Violence is not for cowards. It is for the brave, the
courageous. And the Pathans are more brave and courageous than the Hindus. That is
the reason why the Pathans were able to remain non-violent’ (pp. 193-194).
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Something that is often underestimated is the deeply spiritual nature of this movement. Khan
repeatedly emphasized that this was not just a social or political movement but a spiritual
movement. The creation of a culture of peace requires true emancipation in every aspect of
life, from the spiritual to the political. This is perhaps the single-most explanation or secret of
the phenomenal success of the KKM and their profound ability to endure unspeakable
brutalities unleashed on them by the British. Yet, the oppressive forces around them were
ruthless against them.
Diversity, Partition and Suppression
As part of their divide and rule policies, the British were relentless in their promotion of the
Muslim League, who were mostly anti-Hindu and wanted to create Pakistan as a separate
country (Banerjee, 2000; Shah, 2015). To foster support for the Muslim League, a major
tactic was propaganda creating fear among Muslims that the Hindus, who outnumbered them
in India, would suppress them if the British left (Shah, 2015). This meant that they were more
likely to want the British to remain. The propaganda and fears over what might happen if
independence did materialize gave rise to violence between Hindus and Muslims in different
parts of India. The British and the Muslim League would then use the examples of Hindu
attacks to create fear among the Muslims, especially among the Pakhtuns. However, the
North West Frontier Province of the Pakhtuns was the only Muslim majority region where
despite all the efforts of the British and the Muslim League, the latter failed to get a foothold.
Michael Cook (2006) refers to studies that indicate that those who habitually engage in
actions of rescue and the attempt to prevent wrong, in addition to being courageous, tend to
be less likely to discriminate between people. This characteristic was clearly apparent among
the KKM members and their actions. This tolerant embrace of difference was exemplified by
Ghaffar Khan and the KKs and other Pakhtuns as well. When Muslims who supported the
Muslim League attacked Hindus and Sikhs, the KKs went in to act as human shields to
protect them against the attacks of their co-religionists. Non-Muslim villagers who escaped
from their villages, returned without fear, due to this protection. Not only the KKs, but some
other like-minded Muslim tribes formed “peace committees,” to protect the lives and
property of the non-Muslims (Shah, 2015). They also made the commitment to struggle for
the liberation of Hindustan (India), which says a lot about their religious tolerance (Shah,
2007).
Arbab (2017) notes:
…the Khudai Khidmatgar ideology of nonviolence and its politics of friendship were
attempting to iterate an alternative set of normativities that were in stark contradistinction to the long lineage of normative Western political philosophy that
structures the state (p. 227).
These are the makings of peace culture. Arbab (2017) says the Muslim League had adopted
the “epistemological frameworks and normative standards in which violence was (and
continues to be) considered an inevitable norm” (p. 227). For instance, a culture of peace
operates on a respect for diversity of interests and is willing to act on good will and take the
associated risks; the culture of violence seeks to control every outcome through the use of
force/power over the other. The insistence on the formation of a separate country from those
who were different, in this case Hindus, was based on eschewing good will for the power and
access to violent force that statehood entailed. As feminist scholar Sharon Welch (1990)
notes, “The only type of power that is guaranteed to be successful is destructive power. One
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can ensure the death of an enemy, but one cannot ensure the cooperation of another in
mutually fulfilling transforming work. The pursuit of guaranteed total fulfilment produces the
destruction of life” (p. 120). The Pakhtuns, with the guidance of the KKs, represented
something diametrically opposed to the logic of British imperialism and notion of
civilization. Gandhi had always said that the British could stay but it was their form of
civilization (which represented the culture of violence) that violated swaraj, and therefore,
had to go. This was the same with the KKM. The greater jihad to control one’s passions or
swaraj in Gandhi’s terminology was the deeper source of spiritual force.
Thus, as Ghaffar Khan (1969) recalls, “The British used to say, ‘a non-violent Pathan is more
dangerous than a violent Pathan’” (p. 145). By banning Ghaffar Khan from the region for
significant periods when he was not kept in jail, and along with him, many of the KKs, the
Muslim League was eventually able to get some support, especially among the wealthy, big
khans and mullahs who were under British pay, as well as some in the tribal areas where
Ghaffar Khan and the KKs had been banned from entering. Despite this, when Ghaffar
Khan’s brother as the Congress representative for the region contested in 1947, Congress won
decisively. Ghaffar Khan mentions how the British government had closed the school, getting
students to canvass for the Muslim League, and British women had gone around canvassing
for them (Ghaffar Khan, 1969). This was a clear indication that the Pakthuns had no issue
with the Hindus, and therefore, were against partition. This is why, when the Muslim League
insisted on partition, and Congress under Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to it, accepting the British
proposal to hold a referendum (whether they would join India or Pakistan) in the region,
Ghaffar Khan and the KK boycotted the whole thing as they considered it an insult to the
Pakhtun people (Ghaffar Khan, 1969). This meant that the only ones who did vote were
mostly those who had been won over by the Muslim League, and they voted for Pakistan; in
addition, there had been major fraud involved in the voting (Ghaffar Khan, 1969; Shah,
2015). Ghaffar Khan and the KKs felt that if partition was going to happen, the Pakhtuns
should at least have been given autonomy over their region rather than be forced to live under
the Congress Party in India that had abandoned them, or the Muslim League that represented
everything they had opposed (Arbab, 2017; Shah, 2015). Ghaffar Khan said that they had
been thrown to the wolves; the two spiritual leaders, Gandhi and Khan, who led possibly the
most powerful nonviolent movements the world has seen, were left heartbroken. Neither of
them participated in the independence celebrations. The anguish they both felt is clear in
Gandhi’s words, “I cannot bear to see Badshah Khan’s grief. His inner agony wrings my
heart. But, if I gave way to tears, it would be cowardly, and the stalwart Pathan as he is, he
would break down” (quoted in Tendulkar, 1967, p. 422). Gandhi had intended to go to
Pakistan to support the Pakhtuns and Khan, but he was assassinated by a fellow Hindu. Khan
and most of the KKs were put in jail for a long period and the KKM was banned by the new
country of Pakistan. Thus, despite the relentless persistence the Pakhtuns showed in their
desire to construct a peace culture, from the commitment to nonviolence, to gender issues and
diversity, they were “ruthlessly suppressed” by the British and then the Pakistan they created
(Jansson, 1991).
Conclusion
The imperative to take a second look at how Pakhtuns are depicted even in accounts of Khan
and the KKs, is ever more important now. As the scholar Taj (2011) points out, the
misrepresentation of pakhtunwali has led to attributing the presence of the Taliban amongst
some of them to their notions such as hospitality and forgiveness. Even these virtues of their
culture are represented as vices. However, hospitality requires the guest or enemy to
surrender their weapons, which the Taliban have not done, and as several scholars familiar
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with the culture and region have noted, the Taliban engaged in massive suppression and
killing of Pakhtun elders and other people; eventually, some of them have ended up joining
them (Ghufran, 2009; Rothing & Taj, 2011), like they did when constraints forced them into
joining Pakistan. My discussion above shows that much within the culture and Islamic beliefs
of the Pakhtuns, as exemplified in their preference for Ghaffar Khan and the KKM, leans in
the direction of peace culture and is diametrically opposed to everything the Taliban enforces.
If peace scholars fail to see amongst these people, despite the troubling behavior of some
among them, all the virtues I have described above, we continue to valorize the KKM in a
way that defeats their cause—a culture of peace for the Pakhtuns. Thus, we continue to
“tyrannize and outrage” them, throwing them to the wolves, as Ghaffar Khan lamented,
providing the structures that are only conducive to the cultural tools that promote violence.
Endnotes
1

*The author presented this paper on 8 July, 2020, at the Research Seminar of the Faculty of
Theology and Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Signadou (Canberra) Campus, and
would like to thank the participants for their feedback.
2
The terms Pakhtun, Pashtun and Pathan are used to refer to the same group of people, often
depending on particular dialects and how the Pashto word may be transcribed in English
(Arbab, 2017).
3
This list of people who came in through this pass includes the Aryans, Persians, Greeks,
Scythians, White Huns, Mongols, Muslims, among others.
4
There were a range of approaches the British took to subdue the tribal people. Due to the
cost of military operations, at first they adopted what was a “close border” policy of using
non-military forms of manipulations to extract revenue and maintain access and control,
eventually this gave way to the “Forward Policy,” which was outright military conquest. See
for instance, the following discussion of British strategies and errors as guidelines for current
operations (Williams, 2005).
5
Banerjee notes that arbitrators and peacemakers in Pakhtun tradition carried the Quran on
their heads as a symbol of reconciliation. Tendulkar (1967) describes it as a gesture of a
humiliated weaker party asking for pardon. However, Tendulkar seems to have relied heavily
on colonial sources, as noted by other scholars such as Sruti Bala (2013).
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